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Modeling Patient Decision-Making: The Role
of Base-Rate and Anecdotal Information
Angela K. Freymuth1,3 and George F. Ronan2
Guidelines for managing patient–physician relationships often stem from either paternalistic
or shared decision-making perspectives. Despite a number of advantages shown for the shared
decision-making model, questions remain as to whether lay people make the most optimal
decisions about their health care. This study explored the influence of anecdotal and base-rate
information on health-care decisions. Three hundred and seventeen undergraduates read two
vignettes describing a fictitious disease, followed by a description of two potential treatment
protocols. The comparison treatment was 50% effective and accompanied by an anecdote that
described a patient whose treatment resulted in an ambiguous outcome. A second treatment
was presented as 30, 50, 70, or 90% effective, and accompanied by an anecdote that described
a patient whose treatment resulted in a positive, ambiguous, or negative outcome. Subjects
weighted anecdotal information more heavily than base-rate, or statistical, information when
the anecdotal information was clearly positive or negative. Subjects presented with ambiguous
anecdotal information weighed base-rate information most heavily. Implications for enhancing
patient decision-making are discussed.
KEY WORDS: patient decision-making; medical decision-making; clinical decision-making; anecdote;
base-rate.
INTRODUCTION
There are several models for managing patient–
physician relationships. The most traditional is the pa-
ternalistic model, which is characterized by limited
patient involvement in medical decision-making. In
this model, the physician takes on the role of diag-
nosing a condition and selecting treatment options.
The basic assumption is that physicians and patients
share a common goal and that physicians alone have
the information and experience needed to make a
competent decision (Deber, 1994). With the develop-
ment of information technologies, patients have in-
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creased access to information regarding the diagnosis
and treatment of most medical conditions. Patients
are now able to use this information to confirm diag-
noses, obtain second opinions, contact support groups,
and aid in their medical decision-making. This implies
that patient–physician relationships are changing with
more patients taking an active role in making medical
decisions.
Legal mandates have also contributed to the
changing nature of patient–physician relationships.
Informed consent laws mandate that patients con-
sent to treatment before any treatment can be im-
plemented. As a result, decision-making is shared at
least at a minimal level as patients understand and
agree to treatment.
In contrast to the paternalistic model, the shared
model of patient–physician interaction is character-
ized by a two-way decision-making process. The
shared model has been proposed as the ideal model
for medical decision-making, with physicians and pa-
tients working together to craft optimal decisions
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(Deber, 1994). There are significant advantages to
the shared decision-making model. For example, in-
dividuals who participate in decisions about their own
medical treatment have been found to have less mor-
bidity than those who do not participate (Greenfield,
Kaplan, & Ware, 1985; Lerman et al., 1990; Mahler
& Kulik, 1990). Increased involvement of patients in
medical decision-making has also been found to in-
crease satisfaction with medical treatment in cases
where there is more than one alternative treatment
recommendation (Moyer & Solovey, 1998). Finally,
shared decision-making has been found to be related
to increased adherence to treatment (Speedling &
Rose, 1985).
Despite the fact that patient–physician interac-
tions following the shared decision-making model
have been found to have a positive impact, the ques-
tions remains: Can patients make accurate and effec-
tive decisions regarding their health care? What are
the obstacles?
Some research suggests that even with adequate
information, eliciting reasonable, informed and un-
biased decisions from patients can be a difficult task
(Redelmeier, Rozin, & Kahneman, 1993). There are
a number of errors that individuals make when faced
with decisions in general. These include the anchor-
ing heuristic, biased search strategies, and the avail-
ability heuristic. In a review of the medical decision-
making literature, Redelmeier et al. (1993) outlined
several decision-making errors that patients often
make when faced with a medical problem. These
errors can be conceptualized into three broad cate-
gories: (1) over reliance on past experiences, (2) emo-
tional override, and (3) not comprehending statistical
information.
In a classic article (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973),
Kahneman and Tversky provided participants with a
personality description of an individual whose person-
ality was similar to a stereotypical depiction of either
a lawyer or an engineer. Participants were told the
base-rate of lawyers to engineers was 7 to 3. Partici-
pants subsequently guessed the occupation that went
with each personality description. Base-rate informa-
tion had no discernable impact. That is, personality
descriptions that matched the stereotype of a lawyer
were attributed to a lawyer and personality descrip-
tions that matched the stereotype of an engineer were
attributed to an engineer. The authors commented
that people lack the cognitive ability to deal with base-
rate information. That is, subjects did not understand
the robustness of statistics based on large samples
and relied on individual portrayals. This blindness to
sample size has also been coined the “belief in the law
of small numbers” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971).
The authors are unaware of previous studies that
have used an analogue design to explore what infor-
mation people pay attention to when making medi-
cal decisions. The current study aimed to do just this.
More specifically, this study asked: How do college
students weight anecdotal versus base-rate, or sta-
tistical, information when making judgments in the
context of medical decision-making? The ultimate
goal was to generate hypotheses regarding how physi-




Three hundred and seventeen students from un-
dergraduate psychology courses at a medium size
Midwestern University participated in this study. All
participants read and signed the Internal Review
Board approved informed consent document prior
to their participation. Ages ranged from 18 to 25
(M = 19; SD = 1.45). Seventy-six percent (n = 241)
of the participants were female. Fifty-three percent
(n = 168) were freshmen, 24% (n = 76) were sopho-
mores, 15% (n = 48) were juniors, and 8% (n = 25)
were seniors. Of the 312 subjects who reported their
race, 89% were Caucasian.
Materials
Vignettes
A series of vignettes assessed decision-making.
The vignettes described a fictitious disease, Schistom-
anliasis (SCIMAS). A fictitious disease was used to
eliminate the possibility of familiarity with the infor-
mation about the disease. The name, Schistomanliasis,
was derived from a combination of diseases endemic
to Africa and the parasites that cause them. Symptoms
associated with Creutzfeld–Jacob’s Disease were used
to develop fictitious disease related symptoms. More
specifically, SCIMAS was described as a disease that
causes significant muscular and cognitive difficulties
that, if left untreated, eventually lead to death. SCI-
MAS infection reportedly stemmed from exposure
to the microscopic eggs of a parasitic flatworm. It was
presented as affecting men and women of all ages and
racial groups. To further increase the relevance, the
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disease was presented as a particular risk to individu-
als who reside in the Midwestern section of the United
States. Finally, to ensure that participants would un-
derstand the importance of making a treatment deci-
sion, it was explicitly stated that untreated individu-
als would certainly die within a period of 12 months.
All subjects received the exact same description of
SCIMAS.
The two fictitious treatments for SCIMAS were
developed in a similar manner. The name for the
control treatment, Fluortrexate, was derived from
a combination of two chemicals commonly used in
chemotherapy, Fluorouracil and Methotrexate. The
name of the manipulated treatment, Tamoxol, was
derived from combining the names for two com-
mon chemotherapy drugs, Tamoxifen and Taxol. Both
treatments were presented as chemical treatments,
consequences presented for the procedures were
equal, and the number of words used to describe each
treatment was equal.
The vignette involving Fluortrexate was always
presented as 50% effective and served as the com-
parison condition. The vignettes involving Tamoxol
presented the treatment effectiveness base-rate as 30,
50, 70, or 90% effective. Except for the changing base-
rate, the number of words, the structure, and the con-
tent of all information regarding treatment effective-
ness were identical.
Participants also read anecdotal accounts of
patient responsiveness to treatment. The anecdote
paired with Fluortrexate was about Chris, a 20-
year-old “typical” college student who hoped to be
a schoolteacher someday. Chris was diagnosed with
SCIMAS and was faced with choosing a treatment.
Chris chose Fluortrexate and the results were am-
biguous: Chris and the doctors were not sure if de-
ciding on Fluortrexate was the right or the wrong
decision.
The anecdotes paired with Tamoxol were pos-
itive, ambiguous, or negative. The story was about
Pat, a 20-year-old “typical” college student who even-
tually wanted to teach at the college level. Pat was
diagnosed with SCIMAS and was faced with choos-
ing a treatment. The overall format for the different
Tamoxol anecdotal conditions follows.
Positive anecdote condition: Pat’s decision to un-
dergo Tamoxol resulted in a positive outcome.
The entire worm was destroyed. Doctors were
confident the disease would not resume its
course. At 1-month posttreatment Pat’s recov-
ery was certain.
Negative anecdote condition: Pat’s decision to un-
dergo Tamoxol resulted in a poor outcome.
The worm was not completely destroyed. The
disease resumed its course. At 1-month post-
treatment Pat was blind and has lost the ability
to walk.
Ambiguous anecdote condition (Tamoxol and
Fluortrexate): Pat/Chris was unsure if the deci-
sion was right or wrong (i.e., was ambiguous).
Doctors were not certain whether the worm
was destroyed. Doctors were unable to deter-
mine whether the disease would resume its
course. At 1-month posttreatment Pat/Chris is
having good days and bad.
To reduce potential bias, the content and
structure of the anecdotes for the control treat-
ment (Fluortrexate) and the manipulated treatment
(Tamoxol) were very similar with only a few de-
tails changed to ensure the stories were realistic.
Both the character names (Chris and Pat) and the
career path (teacher and college professor) were
gender-neutral. The number of words devoted to
the different treatments, anecdotal information, and
base-rates was identical. Finally, the order of presenta-
tion for the base-rate and anecdotal information was
counterbalanced.
Comprehension of Vignette Information
A quiz assessed whether participants processed
the information presented in the vignettes. To en-
hance motivation levels, participants were told ahead
of time that they would be given snack items and
candies of their choice based on their performance
on the quiz. Items on the quiz were organized into
three distinct groups; knowledge, believability, and
understandability. The six-item knowledge measure
asked questions about the name of the disease, anec-
dotal information, and base-rate information. An-
swers were scored as either correct (2) or incorrect (1).
The believability scale contained three items about
the disease, the treatments, and the afflicted individu-
als. Participants rated how believable the information
was using a 10-point scale and internal consistency
was adequate (α = .82). The understandability scale
contained three items about the disease, the treat-
ments, and the afflicted individuals. Participants rated
how understandable the information was using a 10-
point scale and internal consistency was acceptable
(α = .80).
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Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to 1 of the 12
conditions (4 base-rate conditions and 3 anecdote
conditions). This was done by randomly ordering the
12 different versions of the information packet and
handing them out to students seated in their class-
rooms. After reading the instructions, subjects com-
pleted a demographic information form, read descrip-
tive information about SCIMAS, and read the control
treatment vignette. To control for order effects, half
of the subjects read the anecdotal information about
Tamoxol and then the base-rate information about
Tamoxol, whereas the other half read the base-rate
information about Tamoxol and then the anecdotal in-
formation about Tamoxol. Subjects were instructed to
place themselves in the situation as much as possible
and to choose a course of treatment (i.e., Fluortrexate
or Tamoxol). Subjects handed the materials back to
the experimenter and completed the quiz about the
quality of information presented. Rewards and de-
briefing forms were dispensed.
RESULTS
Point–biserial correlations were used to deter-
mine whether age, gender, race, year in school, or-
der of presentation of the material, history of past
illnesses, previous experience with medical decision-
making, current perception of health, or reported
prior knowledge of SCHIMAS were related to the
treatment choice. The lack of any significant findings
suggests that treatment choice was independent of
these variables.
A two-dimensional MANOVA was used to de-
termine whether subjects exposed to the different
conditions processed the information to a similar ex-
tent. More specifically, a 3 (positive, ambiguous, or
negative anecdotes) × 4 (90, 70, 50, or 30% base-rate)
MANOVA was used, with scores on the Believability,
Knowledge, and Understandability questions serving
as the dependent variables. The results showed a sig-
nificant Omnibus F for anecdotes, F(6, 604) = 3.74;
p < .01. No significant differences were found for
base-rate information, F(2, 303) = 0.57; p = .82, or
the interaction between anecdote and base-rate infor-
mation, F(18, 909) = 1.32; p = .17. Univariate anal-
yses revealed significant differences for the anecdote
condition on two of the dependent measures; Knowl-
edge, F(2, 303) = 5.82; p < .01, and Understand-
ability, F(2, 303) = 5.51; p < .01. Follow-up contrast
using Tukey’s HSD test revealed that subjects in
the negative anecdote conditions obtained lower
scores on the Knowledge items than subjects in ei-
ther the positive (p = .01) or the neutral (p = .02)
anecdote conditions. No other significant differences
were found. On the Understandability items, the only
significant difference was subjects in the negative
anecdotal condition obtained lower scores on the
Understandability items than subjects in the posi-
tive anecdotal condition (p = .01). A perusal of the
means associated with each condition revealed only
small differences (Knowledge mean scores ranged
from 10.60 to 11.40; Understandability mean scores
ranged from 21.32 to 23.31).
Treatment Chosen
Because treatment chosen is a dichotomous vari-
able, chi-square analyses were used to test hypotheses.
Analyses were conducted with and without control-
ling for scores on the Knowledge and Understand-
ability scores. Because controlling for Knowledge and
Understandability scores had no significant impact,
the results of the simpler (noncontrolled) analyses are
presented.
An initial analysis revealed that assignment
to conditions had a significant influence on treat-
ment choice, χ2(1, 11) = 117.17, p < .001. Sub-
sequent analyses revealed a significant impact
for anecdotes, χ2(1, 2) = 84.56, p < .001, base-rate,
χ2(1, 11) = 24.81, p < .001, and the interaction be-
tween anecdotes and base-rate, χ2(1, 7) = 96.84, p <
.001. Follow-up analyses contrasted the proportion
of subjects who chose the manipulated treatment in
the positive and negative anecdote conditions with
the percentage of subjects who chose the manipu-
lated treatment in the ambiguous condition. Addi-
tional analyses contrasted the number of subjects who
chose the manipulated treatment in the 90, 70, and
30% base-rate conditions with the number of sub-
jects who chose the manipulated treatment in the 50%
base-rate condition. As shown in Table I, subjects
exposed to the negative anecdote were significantly
less likely to choose the manipulated treatment than
subjects exposed to the ambiguous anecdote. More-
over, subjects exposed to the positive anecdote were
more likely to choose the manipulated treatment even
when the base-rate for that treatment was significantly
less than the alternative treatment (50% in the con-
trol treatment vs. 30% in the manipulated treatment).
With regard to the influence of base-rate, participants
in the negative anecdote condition were still more
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Table I. Percent of Subjects Choosing the Manipulated Treatment
(Tamoxol)
Base-rate
90% 70% 50% 30%
Positive anecdote 88 92 93a 78a
n 26 26 27 27
Ambiguous anecdote 81 81 69 29b
n 26 26 26 28
Negative anecdote 39a,b 43a,b 15a 07a
n 28 24 26 27
aSignificantly different from the corresponding ambiguous anec-
dote condition (p < .05).
bSignificantly different from the 50% base-rate condition (p < .05).
likely to choose the manipulated treatment when the
base-rates were significantly higher (90 and 70%) than
the 50% base-rate.
A 3 (anecdote) × 4 (base-rate) ANOVA was
used to test how confident subjects were in their treat-
ment decisions. A main effect was found for the in-
fluence of anecdotal information on confidence rat-
ings, F(2, 304) = 4.94; p < .01. The main effect for
base-rate information, F(3, 304) = 0.396; p = .756, as
well as the interaction between anecdote and base-
rate were not significant, F(6, 304) = 1.48, p = .185.
Post hoc contrasts using Tukey’s HSD statistic were
employed to determine where these significant dif-
ferences emerged. Overall, subjects in the positive
anecdote condition (M = 6.89, SD = 2.23) reported
more confidence in their decisions than subjects in
the ambiguous anecdote condition (M = 5.87; SD =
2.54; p = .006). There were no significant differences
for subjects in the negative anecdote condition (M =
6.51, SD = 2.26).
DISCUSSION
This study explored how undergraduate col-
lege students weight base-rate versus anecdotal infor-
mation when making judgments in a health-related
context. In general, subjects weighted anecdotal in-
formation greater than base-rate information. For
instance, subjects chose a less effective treatment
if the more effective treatment was paired with a
negative anecdote. In addition, subjects were more
likely to choose a 30% effective treatment, in compar-
ison to a 50% effective treatment, when the 30% ef-
fective treatment was paired with a positive anecdote.
In contrast, subjects in the ambiguous anecdotal con-
ditions were more likely to base their decision-making
on base-rate information. That is, in the absence
of clear anecdotal information decisions were more
likely to match base-rate information.
Patients are exposed to a considerable amount of
information about diseases and treatments through
mediums such as television, the Internet, friends,
and family. Most of this information is likely to be
anecdotal and these results imply that such informa-
tion is likely to exert a strong influence over patient
decision-making. Although some research has found a
shared decision model for patient–physician relation-
ships is the most efficacious (Deber, 1994), health-care
providers who espouse this model might need to be
more conscious of the impact of providing anecdo-
tal information so that the most effective treatments
are heavily weighted. Choosing a treatment is likely
to be enhanced by pairing the treatment with a pos-
itive anecdote. Avoiding a treatment is likely to be
enhanced by pairing the treatment with a negative
anecdote. Because base-rate information did influ-
ence decision-making when treatments were new and
anecdotal information was scarce, a clear presenta-
tion of the ambiguous anecdotal information is likely
to help patients to choose treatments based on base-
rate data. Finally, physicians can probably devote less
attention to the order in which they present informa-
tion, as it did not matter whether participants initially
received anecdotal or the base-rate information.
Having subjects rate their certitude for choos-
ing one treatment over another assessed the influ-
ence of anecdotal and base-rate information on the
degree of confidence in their decision-making. Ex-
posure to the positive anecdote, in contrast with ex-
posure the ambiguous anecdote, resulted in higher
confidence ratings. No significant difference emerged
when contrasting subjects exposed to the negative
anecdote with subjects exposed to either the posi-
tive or ambiguous anecdote. That is, subjects in the
negative anecdote condition chose the treatment with
a lower base-rate of success more often that sub-
jects in the positive condition, but their ratings of
confidence in their decisions were similar. Moreover,
subjects rated negative information as slightly less
understandable than the positive information and
this implies that students were less likely to under-
stand or remember negative information presented.
Nonetheless, negative anecdotal information did in-
fluence treatment decisions and patient overall level
of confidence in their decision-making was not in-
fluenced. There is little research available to guide
speculation. These findings suggest that further re-
search on how patients process negative information
is needed.
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The use of healthy undergraduate students sets
limits on the degree to which these findings can be
generalized to real-life health-care decision-making.
The present study was able to control for many threats
to internal validity and we believe this is important
because of the lack of existing research in this area.
Clearly, people who are currently suffering from med-
ical illness have a more vested interest in choosing an
appropriate medical treatment and might be prone
to more carefully weigh information. However, they
may also be more emotionally involved and this emo-
tionality might reduce their ability to think objec-
tively. According to Raghunathan and Pham (1999),
individuals faced with serious medical decisions are
under a great deal of stress and the decision-making
process could be altered by their affective state. In ad-
dition to emotionality, real-life health-care decision-
making might also be influenced by past experiences.
Most undergraduate students report little personal
experience with serious illness and important medical
decisions. Therefore, the sample in this study might be
less prone to making health-care decisions based on
anecdotal information or past experiences. We antic-
ipate exploring these effects using clinical samples.
Another line of research could begin to examine
how anecdotal and base-rate information influence
the health-care decisions of people across the lifespan
and, in particular, older healthy populations for whom
medical decisions are more salient. Such research
would provide important information to physicians
regarding how they should discuss treatment options
to clients. In today’s managed health-care environ-
ment, health providers often have less time with pa-
tients, yet are concerned with whether patients utilize
the medical information that is provided. We believe
that systematically providing base-rate and anecdotal
information is likely to result in a more efficient pro-
cedure that helps patients to make the most medically
efficacious decisions.
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